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This study directly relates corporate governance to agency costs of free cash flow in acquisitions. 
We proxy for agency costs of free cash flow by two measures: free cash flows at the fiscal year-
end prior to the acquisition announcement and the eventual use of internally generated funds to 
finance the transaction. We investigate four aspects of corporate governance: institutional investor 
monitoring, board monitoring, the presence of antitakeover provisions, and executive incentive 
strength. We find that the quality of corporate governance indirectly affects merger outcomes by 
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According to the free cash flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986), financial flexibility in 
the form of abundant cash increases the likelihood of managers wasting the cash resources on 
investments that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders and thus will eventually destroy 
shareholder value. Empirical work provides evidence to support this prediction by documenting 
that the marginal value of cash decreases with larger cash holdings and that higher current excess 
cash balances lead to lower future firm value (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008; Lee and Powell, 2011). Prior studies further 
show that corporate governance can affect the correlation between excess cash and firm value. 
Specifically, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that excessive cash reserves reduce firm value 
only if the firm is poorly governed. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) report that excess cash 
holdings have an even more negative impact on firm value when they are combined with weak 
corporate governance.  
A different strand of literature in the setting of mergers and acquisitions adds more empirical 
evidence for the free cash flow hypothesis. Specifically, this literature finds that acquirers with 
substantial free cash flows before the merger announcement experience significantly lower 
abnormal announcement returns (Harford, 1999; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991; Schlingemann, 
2004). This raises the question of whether the relation between free cash flows and takeover returns 
to bidders can also be influenced by corporate governance. To this end, we test the conjecture that 
high (low) quality of governance alleviates (intensifies) the agency costs of free cash flow and 
consequently mitigates (exacerbates) the negative effect of free cash flows on abnormal returns 
earned by the bidder.  
Previous M&A literature studying corporate governance primarily focuses on whether the 
presence of strong governance directly increases bidder abnormal returns realized at the 
announcement of the takeover (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld, 1985; Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie, 2007). This thesis extends the existing literature in two dimensions. First, in light of the prior 
findings that certain governance mechanisms, for example, the market for corporate control, can 
improve bidder announcement-period abnormal returns (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), we aim 
to explore how or through what channels they achieve this. We predict that governance enhances 
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the outcomes of the takeover decisions through improving the use of cash resources in the 
acquisition process and reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. Second, in the case that some 
corporate governance mechanisms, for instance, institutional shareholder monitoring, do not 
directly increase acquirer announcement returns as reported in prior empirical studies (Chen, 
Harford, and Li, 2007; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), we attempt to investigate whether they 
exert their influence indirectly through facilitating more efficient use of cash resources. 
Specifically, we test whether the market reaction to the use of free cash flows by acquirers in the 
acquisition process would be influenced by the quality of corporate governance. We expect that 
the announcement-period abnormal stock returns for acquiring firms that have large free cash 
flows or use internally generated funds to finance the transaction would increase if the firm is well 
governed and reduced if the firm is badly governed.  
We further differentiate between the firm’s ex-ante financing choice on the holding of cash 
before the acquisition and the eventual use of internal funds by the firm to finance the acquisition. 
Harford (1999), Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), and Schlingemann (2004) report a negative 
relationship between the bidder’s free cash flow prior to the acquisition announcement and the 
stock returns to its shareholders. Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003), Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009) and Vladimirov (2015) show that acquisitions financed internally generate lower gains for 
acquirers than those funded with debt, despite the fact that they are both paid with cash. This thesis 
aims to examine whether corporate governance alleviates the free cash flow agency problem 
related to both the ex-ante internal financing and the eventual use of internal financing in the same 
way.  
In addition to merger outcomes, we also explore the likelihood of diversification of the bidding 
firm through acquisitions. Specifically, we examine how corporate governance impacts the 
relationship between internal financing and the probability of the acquirer engaging in a 
diversifying takeover. Jensen (1986) and Montgomery (1994) suggest that acquisitions outside the 
industry tend to be driven by management’s pursuit of personal interest, for example, empire 
building motives. We expect that firms with large free cash flows are more likely to undertake 
diversifying mergers, and this higher likelihood would be altered by the presence of strong 
corporate governance and strengthened by lack of strong governance.   
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This study investigates four aspects of corporate governance. The first two aspects, which focus 
on internal governance, are the monitoring by institutional investors and the monitoring by the 
board of directors. The third is related to external governance, more specifically, the disciplinary 
role of the market for corporate control, which is measured by the number of antitakeover 
provisions adopted by the firm. Last, we explore the effectiveness of CEO ownership and 
compensation in aligning the interest of shareholders and management. By examining four 
different corporate governance mechanisms, we attempt to depict a broad and comprehensive 
picture of how various elements of firm governance work together to alleviate the agency costs of 
free cash flow in the acquisition process.  
Our main findings are as follows. First, we re-examine how bidder returns are correlated with 
free cash flow and the use of internal financing by employing a sample consisting of both cash and 
equity deals, and our results confirm the findings in the previous studies which exclusively focus 
on cash transactions (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991; Schlingemann, 2004; Vladimirov, 2015). 
Consistent with prior studies, we find that both the holding of free cash flows before the acquisition 
announcement and the eventual use of internal funds to finance the bid trigger a significantly lower 
abnormal stock return for the bidding firm. Second, although previous M&A literature does not 
find a direct relation between institutional monitoring and acquirer announcement returns (Chen, 
Harford, and Li, 2007; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), the present study shows that large 
institutional investors indirectly influence acquirer gains through the free cash flow channel. 
Specifically, we document that the negative relationship between free cash flows and bidder gains 
will be reversed in the presence of strong institutional monitoring. In contrast, lack of large 
institutional shareholders to monitor corporate decisions will further lower the market reaction to 
acquisition decisions made by firms with large free cash flows. This is evidence consistent with 
the conjecture that strong (weak) corporate governance would mitigate (exacerbate) the agency 
costs of free cash flow. Third, we show that effective monitoring by large institutional investors 
only mitigates the agency problem associated with the holding of free cash flow before the 
takeover announcement, not the eventual use of free cash flow. Fourth, we are unable to find clear 
evidence that other governance mechanisms, including board monitoring, the market for corporate 
control, and executive incentive strength, have significant effects on alleviating agency costs of 
free cash flow in mergers and acquisitions.  
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The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and the methodology, 
respectively. Section 6 discusses univariate and multivariate results of our empirical tests. Section 
7 presents the results for the robustness tests. Section 8 concludes the study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The free cash flow hypothesis  
Jensen (1986) predicts that firms that generate large cash flow reserves and finance projects 
internally will suffer from severe agency costs of free cash flow. With a large holding of cash 
under their discretion, mangers are able to avoid the monitoring by the capital markets and are 
more likely to spend the cash on low-return or even value-destroying investments. For example, 
they may expand the firm beyond its optimal size through takeovers in order to increase their own 
power or earn higher levels of pay.  
Two strands of literature empirically test the free cash flow hypothesis. First, two studies in the 
area of general corporate finance by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008) extend the argument about free cash flow to excess cash reserves, which are 
defined as the difference between actual cash holdings and predicted, normal cash. Both of them 
find that lagged excess cash balances are negatively associated with current operating performance.  
Second, a number of papers in the M&A framework also provide evidence for the free cash 
flow theory of takeovers. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) and Schlingemann (2004) document 
that acquirer abnormal returns decline with the increase in free cash flows for the fiscal year before 
the announcement of the takeover. They both focus on cash transactions, and they measure the 
bidder abnormal returns by eleven-day cumulative abnormal stock returns and three-day market-
adjusted stock returns around merger announcements, respectively. Harford (1999) investigates 
the impact of excess cash holdings, as defined the same way in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), on cumulative abnormal returns from five days before 
to one day after the takeover announcement for acquiring firms. His findings further confirm the 
free cash flow hypothesis by showing a negative relationship between cash residuals and bidder 
returns.  
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2.2. Corporate governance and management of cash  
The agency costs of free cash flow are derived from the conflicts between managers and 
shareholders over the payout and use of firm cash resources. If managers are well monitored, they 
are more likely to use cash and make investments in a way that maximizes shareholders’ wealth. 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) evaluate the impact 
of corporate governance on the use and value of cash by extending the argument about free cash 
flow to excess cash reserves, which are essentially accumulated free cash flows and calculated as 
the difference between actual cash and a predicted normal level of cash. Specifically, the former 
report that excess cash holdings combined with weak corporate governance, as measured by the 
presence of a large number of antitakeover provisions, cause the firm to spend more on capital 
expenditures and acquisitions and less on research and development, and further lead to 
significantly lower firm value, as measured by the market-to-book value. The latter document that 
the negative influence of lagged excess cash on current operating performance, as measured by the 
return on assets, can be reversed by strong corporate governance, as proxied by fewer antitakeover 
provisions and higher institutional blockholdings.  
 
2.3. Corporate governance in M&As 
Existing M&A literature studying corporate governance mainly focuses on the direct impact of 
governance structures on bidder returns, and the results are mixed.  
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) examine the effect of the executive compensation 
structure on the two-day announcement period cumulative abnormal return for the bidding firm 
for a sample of tender offers. Their research shows that bidder gains are positively related to 
executive equity-based compensation, which is measured as the Black-Scholes value of new stock 
options granted to the top five executives as a percentage of total compensation, but insignificantly 
related to ownership controlled by the top five executives.  
Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) report that the cumulative abnormal return 
experienced by the bidder firm from five days before the merger announcement to the merger 
approval date is positively correlated with the percentage of shares owned by senior management 
of the acquirer.  
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Byrd and Hickman (1992) investigate a sample of tender offers and find that acquiring firms in 
which at least half of the board members are independent outside directors experience significantly 
greater two-day announcement abnormal returns. They also document a positive association 
between the fraction of voting shares owned by directors on the board and acquirer gains.   
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) explore the relationships between various corporate governance 
mechanisms and the bidder’s five-day cumulative abnormal return around the takeover 
announcement. They find that more takeover protection provisions and less product market 
competition, both of which are proxies for weak external firm governance, trigger lower acquirer 
returns. In terms of internal governance, they document that monitoring by institutional 
blockholders, public pension funds, or independent directors on the board is not directly associated 
with bidder gains. They also examine the impact of CEO ownership and the CEO’s equity-based 
compensation on acquire gains and find no significant results.  
Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) explicitly investigate the monitoring influences of different types 
of institutional investors on acquisition performance of bidders. Specifically, they measure 
institutional monitoring by five variables, namely total institutional ownership, concentrated 
holdings by the single largest institutional investor, holdings by the five largest institutions, 
holdings by institutional blockholders, and the fraction of shares owned by the five largest long-
term, independent institutional investors. None of these measures are significantly correlated with 
short-run merger performance of the bidder, which is computed as the three-day abnormal 
announcement-period return.  
 
2.4. Free cash flow versus the use of internal financing  
Based on the free cash flow theory, the argument about the negative impact of free cash flow 
on bidder gains can be extended to the actual use of internal financing, which is the eventual use 
of internally generated funds to finance the acquisition. The free cash flow theory of takeovers 
implies that cash-financed takeovers are likely to be driven by empire building motives of 
managers of acquiring firms with free cash flows. Most empirical evidence is consistent with this 
implication.  
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In the univariate setting, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) examine a sample of cash tender 
offers and find that acquirer cumulative abnormal returns for two-, three-, five-, seven-, and ten-
day event windows around the bid announcement are significantly lower for takeovers funded 
entirely with internal sources than for those fully financed by banks. Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009) report that although both paid with cash, deals financed with internal funds yield 
significantly lower cumulative average abnormal returns for bidding firms than those financed 
with debt, no matter in the pre- or post- announcement period or over the three-day event window 
around the announcement.   
In a multivariate framework, Vladimirov (2015) documents a significantly negative effect of 
the use of 100% internal financing on the three-day bidder cumulative abnormal return around the 
deal announcement date by investigating a sample of international acquisitions entirely or partly 
paid with cash.  
  
3. Hypotheses 
The free cash flow hypothesis predicts a negative influence of both free cash flows and the use 
of internal financing on the bidder’s share price reaction to the takeover announcement (Jensen, 
1986). Empirical research provides support to this prediction by documenting that acquirer gains 
are a decreasing function of both free cash flow and the use of internal financing (Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1991; Schlingemann, 2004; Vladimirov, 2015). However, these studies only focus on 
transactions fully or partially paid with cash and exclude all-equity offers out of the analysis. The 
present study extends their research to a sample comprising both cash and equity offers as well as 
one comprising only pure equity deals. We expect that if an acquirer with large amounts of free 
cash flows uses equity to pay for the transaction, the market would incorporate into stock price 
reactions the likelihood of the unused excess cash being misused in the future. That is, the holding 
of free cash flows by the bidder prior to the merger announcement could be enough of a signal to 
trigger significantly lower abnormal stock returns, no matter whether the deal is eventually paid 
with cash. The use of internal funds to finance the transaction is expected to further lower the 
bidder abnormal announcement returns. 
Our first set of hypotheses are therefore formulated as follows: 
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H1a:  Free cash flow is negatively associated with announcement-period abnormal stock returns 
to acquirers.  
H1b: The use of internal financing is negatively associated with announcement-period 
abnormal stock returns to acquirers. 
 
Weak corporate governance exacerbates the agency problem of free cash flow because poorly 
controlled managers have more discretion over the use of cash resources while facing no 
disciplinary consequences. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) show that the combination of 
excess cash and weak corporate governance leads to lower firm value. In this study, we predict 
that the negative relationship between free cash flow or the use of internal financing and acquirer 
returns would strengthen in the presence of poor firm governance. More specifically, we expect 
the interaction term between free cash flow and weak governance as well as that between the use 
of internal financing and weak governance to be significantly and negatively correlated with 
returns for bidding-firm shareholders around the announcement.  
Strong corporate governance plays an essential monitoring role in ensuring managers act in the 
best interest of shareholders. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that the lower firm value for 
companies with high excess cash is ameliorated and even reversed in the presence of strong 
corporate governance. In this research, we formulate two predictions about the relations among 
strong governance, free cash flow or the use of internal financing, and acquirer returns. First, we 
predict that strong firm governance would mitigate the negative influence of free cash flow or the 
use of internal financing on takeover returns to the bidder’s shareholders. More specifically, we 
expect the interaction variable between free cash flow and strong governance as well as that 
between the use of internal financing and strong governance to be significantly positively related 
to bidder gains. Second, we further predict that the positive value of the coefficient on these 
interaction terms would cover the negative value of the coefficient on the free cash flow or the use 
of internal financing variable itself. That is, the negative relationship between free cash flow or the 
use of internal financing and acquirer returns would be completely cancelled out by the presence 
of effective governance structures.  
We proxy for corporate governance by four measures: institutional ownership concentration, 
monitoring by the board of directors, the presence of antitakeover provisions, and CEO 
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compensation structures. Firms with strong (weak) governance are those within the top (bottom) 
quartile of institutional ownership concentration, board monitoring, and CEO incentive strength 
as well as those within the bottom (top) quartile of the number of antitakeover provisions. We 
discuss in detail the definitions of these governance proxies in the data section (Section 4.4) and 
the way we construct dummies for strong and weak governance in the methodology section 
(Section 5.2).  
Our second set of hypotheses are developed as follows: 
H2a: Free cash flow combined with weak corporate governance will decrease acquirer 
announcement returns, while the combination of free cash flow and strong governance will 
improve acquirer returns and further cancel out the negative impact of free cash flow on acquirer 
returns.  
H2b: The use of internal financing combined with weak corporate governance will decrease 
acquirer announcement returns, while the combination of free cash flow and strong governance 
will improve acquirer returns and further cancel out the negative impact of the use of internal 
financing on acquirer returns. 
 
4. Data and Sample Construction 
4.1. SDC sample selection  
The initial sample of U.S. domestic acquisitions announced between 1990 and 2016 is 
constructed from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC). 
We extract all completed transactions where the bidder is publicly listed and the target is either a 
public firm, a private firm, or a subsidiary. We include only deals categorized by SDC as merger 
and acquisition of assets. We specifically exclude leverage buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, 
self-tenders, repurchases, and privatizations. Acquirers that are financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) 
and regulated utilities (SIC 4900-4999) also are excluded. We require that the acquirer owns no 
more than 50% of the target prior to the acquisition announcement and takes over 100% following 
completion. To ensure that the takeover deals are large enough to have detectable value effects on 
the bidder, we require transaction value be at least $1 million (Bena and Li, 2014; Doukas and 
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Petmezas, 2007; Jaffe et al., 2015). We further require the method of payment be either cash, 
equity or a mix of cash and equity.  
The screening criteria and the observations remaining after applying each criterion are tabulated 
in Panel A of Table 1.  
 
4.2. Acquirer returns 
In order to match the initial SDC sample with the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database and the Compustat database to obtain stock price information and accounting data, we 
first associate unique, permanent identifiers, PERMNO and GVKEY, with each acquirer in the 
sample using the method of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014). The details of the procedure are 
specified in Appendix 2.  
We extract stock price data from CRSP by matching PERMNO. We use 11-day cumulative 
abnormal stock returns (CARs) around initial bid announcements as bidder announcement period 
returns. Daily abnormal stock returns are computed using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), with the value weighted CRSP index as the proxy for the market returns. The period 
used to estimate the systematic risk is 200 days, ending two months before the bid announcement 
to minimize the potential bias due to information leakage (Cai and Sevilier, 2012; Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman, 2002; Harford, Jenter, and Li, 2011). The details of the calculation of CARs 
are discussed in the methodology section.  
Following Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), we remove acquirers with multiple-class shares 
from the sample, as each of those firms can have multiple CARs for the same announcement date. 
In order to avoid contamination during the estimation period, we further delete the consecutive bid 
announced within 200 days following the previous transaction made by the same acquirer 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2009).  
 
4.3. Proxies for agency costs of free cash flow 
We measure the agency costs of free cash flow for bidders in acquisitions in two ways. The first 
measure is the free cash flow, which is the ex-ante internal financing during the fiscal year prior 
to the takeover announcement. Following previous literature, we compute it as operating income 
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before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, and preferred and common dividends 
normalized by book value of total assets (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991; Lehn and Poulsen, 
1989; Schlingemann, 2004). We obtain the data from Compustat by matching GVKEY.  
We use free cash flows rather than excess cash reserves to proxy for the agency costs of free 
cash flow in acquisitions for two reasons. First, excess cash stockpiles are essentially accumulated 
free cash flows (Harford, 1999). Both of these two measures have been used in previous M&A 
literature to represent the agency problem of free cash flow and lead to the same conclusion that 
confirms the free cash flow hypothesis. We therefore expect similar results from either of the two 
measures. Second, measures of free cash flows are subject to less subjectivity than measures of 
excess cash holdings. In order to estimate excess cash reserves, one must first be able to calculate 
expected normal cash holdings. There is no consistent way to do this, since previous studies that 
examine excess cash reserves, for example, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008) and Harford (1999), all employ different models to predict normal cash. We, 
therefore, elect to use free cash flows as our measure of managerial discretion. 
The second measure that we apply to proxy for the agency costs of free cash flow in mergers is 
the use of internal financing at the time of the bid announcement, which is defined as the actual 
use of internal funds to finance the takeover. We construct a dummy variable for internal financing, 
which is equal to one when the deal is entirely financed with internal funds, and zero otherwise. 
Financing with internal funds is different from paying with cash in that cash payment may come 
from different sources, namely internally generated funds, debt issue, or equity issue, whereas cash 
paid for internally financed deals is only from internal funds. The information on the source of 
funds is from SDC. By requiring the data on sources of financing, we lose more than half of the 
observations. In order to eliminate any possible bias due to this substantial sample shrinkage, we 
run our tests separately for the sample for internal financing and the sample for free cash flow. The 
observations remaining after requiring data on acquirer returns, free cash flows, and control 
variables are displayed in Panel B of Table 1. 




4.4. Proxies for corporate governance 
The present study investigates four major aspects of corporate governance, each of which has 
been suggested by prior literature to be potentially able to mitigate the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders. Specifically, the first two sets of governance proxies deal with the 
efficacy of internal governance. The third measure is related to the discipline of the market for 
corporate control. And the last proxy captures the effectiveness of executive incentives in 
alleviating managerial entrenchment.  
First, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that the presence of 
large shareholders can serve as a valuable tool in addressing managerial agency conflicts. We 
construct two variables for large shareholder monitoring: ownership controlled by the single 
largest institutional investor (TOP1) and the sum of ownership controlled by institutions holding 
at least 5% of the firm’s shares (BLOCK). The data is measured at the quarter-end preceding the 
bid announcement and is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (Form 13F) 
database by matching 6-digit CUSIP.  
Second, we examine the efficacy of the firm’s board of directors in monitoring the behaviors 
of managers. Prior literature suggests that the monitoring function of the board is mainly 
undertaken by independent directors (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) and that the board quality depends on the directors’ incentives to 
monitor corporate decisions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this thesis, 
we use board independence, which is calculated as the ratio of the number of independent directors 
to total board size, and director incentive strength, which is measured as total ownership by the 
directors on the board, to proxy for the quality of board oversight. Because of the restriction of 
data availability, we measure board of director characteristics at the end of the earliest year before 
the acquisition in which the information is available instead of at the fiscal year-end immediately 
preceding the acquisition announcement. In doing so, we assume that the information on board 
structures remains unchanged during the years following the most recent release of such 
information. We obtain the data from the RiskMetrics database by matching GVKEY. Since the 
director data provided by RiskMetrics only covers the period starting in 1996 and the companies 
included in the S&P 1500 index, we lose more than half of the observations by requiring the data. 
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Third, a series of studies by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), 
Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) show that the market 
for corporate control is a strong component of external corporate governance in improving 
shareholder rights and enhancing firm value. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) establish that 
more antitakeover provisions can protect managers from the discipline of the market for corporate 
control and thus indicate poor governance. They develop a governance index (G Index) by adding 
one point for the presence of each of the 24 antitakeover provisions provided by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publications. The G Index ranges from zero to 24, and a 
larger number is an indication of weaker shareholder rights. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
extend the G Index to an entrenchment index (E Index) using only the six provisions that they 
suggest have the greatest effect on firm value. The E Index varies between zero and six, and 
similarly, the higher the index is, the more entrenched the managers are assumed to be. This study 
examines both of these two indices. Similar to board of director characteristics, the data on the 
governance indices is measured at the end of the earliest year before the acquisition in which the 
information is available. We obtain the data from the IRRC database by matching GVKEY. Since 
the IRRC dataset only provides governance provisions from 1990 to 2006 for S&P 1500 
companies, the inclusion of the G Index and the E Index severely restricts our sample size.  
Last, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose that firms can align 
managerial behaviors with the interests of shareholders through incentive contracts that increase 
the sensitivity of executive wealth to stock prices. We examine executive incentive strength using 
CEO equity ownership and CEO option-based compensation. CEO equity ownership is defined as 
the percentage of shares held by the firm’s CEO, and CEO option-based compensation is 
calculated as the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted to CEOs scaled by total 
compensation. The data is extracted from ExecuComp by matching GVKEY and is measured at 
the fiscal year-end before the acquisition announcement. Since ExecuComp only covers firms from 
the S&P Composite 1500 index and years after 1992, requiring the information on executive 
ownership and compensation reduces the sample size by half.  
The use of different governance measures from four different databases gives us four samples 
of different size, as shown in Panel A of Table 2. The requirement of data on the source of funds 
further reduces the sample size for each governance measure, as displayed in Panel B of Table 2.  
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[Insert Table 2] 
 
4.5. Control variables 
We control for other bidder characteristics and deal characteristics that have been suggested by 
previous literature to be related to acquisition performance of acquirers. The data on bidder traits 
is obtained from Compustat through matching GVKEY, while that on deal characteristics is 
directly from SDC.  
The bidder characteristics that we control for include leverage, Tobin’s Q, and firm size, all of 
which are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the takeover announcement. Theoretic studies 
by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) contend that debt, by forcing managers to commit themselves 
to paying out future cash flows as interest, can control managerial discretion and reduce the 
likelihood of management over-investing. In our empirical tests, we include leverage as a control 
variable and define it as book value of debts over book value of assets.   
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), and Servaes (1991) use 
Tobin’s Q to proxy for growth opportunities and managerial performance and find that high q 
bidders earn higher announcement abnormal returns. However, Dong et al. (2006) argue that 
Tobin’s q can also proxy for equity overvaluation, and they show that bidders with higher 
valuations experience worse announcement returns. Following the existing literature, we use 
Tobin’s q to control for the effects of the bidder’s growth prospects and the possible misvaluation 
of its stocks. We define Tobin’s q as the ratio of an acquirer’s market value of assets over its book 
value of assets.  
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that large firms tend to gain less in acquisitions 
than small firms. They suggest that large firms suffer more severe managerial hubris and pay more 
for acquisitions. In our analysis, we control for firm size, which is defined as the logarithm of book 
value of total assets.  
The deal characteristics that we control for are means of payment, target ownership status, 
industry relatedness between the bidder and the target, the attitude of target’s management toward 
the bid, the type of the deal, and relative deal size. The pecking order theory advanced by Myers 
and Majluf (1984) implies that takeovers paid with cash will generate greater wealth creation for 
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acquiring firms than those paid with equity due to the negative signalling effects of new equity 
issues. We control for the effect of the method of payment by including the percentage of cash 
payment, which is computed as cash payment as a percentage of total payment, into the analysis.  
Jensen (1986) and Montgomery (1994) predict that mergers between two companies from 
nonrelated industries will lead to lower takeover returns to acquirers because they are more likely 
to be driven by self-interested managers pursuing personal benefits. However, empirical studies 
document mixed findings. Some of them find evidence consistent with the prediction (Bharadwaj 
and Shivdasani, 2003; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990), while others report an insignificant or 
even positive relationship between the bidder return and the industry relatedness between the 
acquirer and the target (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Fischer, 2017; Martynova and Renneboog, 
2009; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Vladimirov, 2015). We capture this effect by creating a 
binary variable indicating diversifying acquisitions, which is equal to one if the bidder and the 
target do not share the same two-digit SIC industry, and zero otherwise.  
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), and Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) report that acquiring private and subsidiary targets creates larger 
benefits for bidders than acquiring public targets. We control for this effect using two indicator 
variables for the acquisition of the subsidiary and the private firm, respectively. In addition, studies 
by Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2004), Schlingemann (2004) document that the value of deal size relative to bidder size 
is positively associated with bidder returns. We thus include the ratio of transaction value to market 
value of bidder’s assets into the regressions. Moreover, following Martynova and Renneboog 
(2009), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), and Schlingemann (2004), we control for both 
whether the deal is a tender offer and whether it is hostile or friendly.  
 
4.6. Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics for acquirer announcement returns, free cash 
flows, and other acquiring-firm and deal characteristics. The mean value of the eleven-day 
cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers is 1.8%. Our significance test shows that it is significant 
at the 99% confidence level. This confirms the findings of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), which document that after including private and 
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subsidiary targets into the sample, the mean abnormal return for bidders are significantly positive. 
The deal traits in our sample are generally consistent with those in Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2004). For example, the percentages of private, subsidiary, and public targets in their sample 
are 46.44%, 31.59%, and 21.97%, respectively, and those in our sample are 49%, 30%, and 21%, 
respectively. They report that the proportion of deals in their sample involving a bidder and a target 
with different two-digit SIC codes is 41.96%, which is very close to the number of 40.8% in our 
sample.  
Panel B of Table 3 provides the summary statistics on different governance proxies for the four 
subsamples. Again, the statistics for our samples are consistent with those in prior literature. 
Specifically, the sample mean, median, and 25th and 75th percentiles of holdings by institutional 
blockholders (INST_BLOCK) and the ratio of independent to total directors on the board 
(INDP_DIR) are close to those in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and in Harford, Mansi, 
Maxwell (2008), respectively. The median, the 25th percentile, and the 75th percentile of the 
governance index (GINDEX) are exactly the same as in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford, 
Mansi, Maxwell (2008), and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007).  
[Insert Table 3] 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1. Short-window event study 
This thesis focuses on acquisition performance over the short run rather than the long run 
because of the serious methodological concerns with the long-horizon event study. Prior work 
suggests that long-horizon event studies are more vulnerable to errors in risk adjustment and more 
sensitive to the model choice in estimating expected returns than short-term event studies (Andrade, 
Mitchell, Stafford, 2001; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Brav, 2002; Fama, 1998; Kothari and Warner, 
1997; Kothari and Warner, 2004; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). 
They find that the method commonly used in the literature studying long-run abnormal stock price 
performance yields severely biased and mis-specified test statistics. In contrast, short-term event 
studies based on simple risk-adjustment approaches have been proved to be well-specified by 
empirical research (Brown and Warner, 1980; Brown and Warner, 1985).  
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By using the short-window event study, we follow the efficient market hypothesis and assume 
that stock prices react to public information without major delays. This assumption has been 
supported by empirical studies, which find no evidence of long-term return anomalies after 
accounting for the methodological problems with long-window event studies (Fama, 1998; 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).  
We measure the short-term wealth effect of the acquisition for the acquirer by the 11-day 
cumulative abnormal stock return around the initial bid announcement, which is calculated using 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by the following steps: 
First, we calculate expected returns. We regress daily stock returns on market risk premiums 
and risk-free rates for each security over the estimation period from 200 days to 60 days before 
the acquisition announcement date to obtain the CAPM parameter estimates: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹), 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the daily return of firm i at day t, 𝑅𝐹 is the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑀 is the market rate of 
return, which is approximated by the return of the value weighted CRSP index, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are 
the CAPM parameters. Then with the estimated 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖, we compute the expected daily stock 
returns over the 11-day event window (-5, +5): 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = ?̃?𝑖 + 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽?̃?(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹), 
where 𝑬(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected return of firm i at day t and ?̃?𝑖 and 𝛽?̃? represent the estimated CAPM 
parameters.  
Next, we compute daily abnormal stock returns. The abnormal stock return is defined as the 
difference between the realized return and the expected return in the absence of the event. We take 
the difference between the actual return of firm i at day t, 𝑅𝑖𝑡, and the expected return of firm i at 
day t, 𝑬(𝑅𝑖𝑡), as the daily abnormal return of firm i at day t, which is denoted by 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑬(𝑅𝑖𝑡). 
Last, we sum up the daily abnormal returns for each firm to obtain the cumulative abnormal 
return over the 11-day event window (-5, +5) around the bid announcement day (0): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝒊 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 
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5.2. Ordinary least squares regression 
We include governance in our analysis as dummy variables by the following steps. We first 
split the sample into quartiles based on the value of the governance measure. Then we construct 
two binary variables: the first takes the value of one if the firm is within the top quartile of the 
governance measure, and zero otherwise, and the second takes on the value of one if the firm is 
ranked in the bottom quartile of the governance measure, and zero otherwise. Our benchmark, 
therefore, are the firms that belong in the two middle quartiles. The first dummy is an indicator for 
weak governance and the second is an indicator for strong governance where governance is 
measured by concentrated holdings by institutional investors, board independence, the fraction of 
shares owned by board members, and CEO incentive strength. Whereas when governance is 
measured by the indices of antitakeover provisions, the opposite holds, which is that the first binary 
variable is an indicator for strong shareholder rights and the second is an indicator for weak 
shareholder rights.  
To explore the relations among free cash flows, corporate governance, and acquiring firm stock 
returns, we estimate the following regression separately for each measure of corporate governance: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 × [𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1
× [𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4[𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5[𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗[𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠]𝑖,𝑡−1
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+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 2 − 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝐶 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
In the regression, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the eleven-day cumulative abnormal announcement-period return 
for the acquirer and 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is computed as operating income before depreciation minus taxes, 
interest expenses, and total dividends scaled by the book value of total assets. We interact the two 
indicator variables for either strong or weak governance with the variable for free cash flows to 
test the impact of corporate governance on the relationship between free cash flows and acquirer 
returns.  
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We extend the analysis to the eventual use of free cash flows to finance the takeover bid by 
replacing the variable for FCF with the variable for the use of internal financing, and again, 
estimate the following regression separately for each measure of corporate governance: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1[𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔]𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2[𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔]𝑖,𝑡−1
× [𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3[𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔]𝑖,𝑡−1
× [𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4[𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5[𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗[𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠]𝑖,𝑡−1
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𝑖=6
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 2 − 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝐶 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where cash financing is a binary dummy equal to one if the acquisition is entirely financed with 
internal funds, and zero otherwise, and other variables are defined the same way as in the previous 
regression.  
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 4 presents how abnormal announcement returns differ between bidders with high versus 
low free cash flows depending on corporate governance strength. Acquiring firms with high (low) 
FCF are those ranked within the top (bottom) quartile of free cash flows, and bidding firms with 
high (low) levels of a governance measure are those ranked in the top (bottom) quartile of that 
governance measure. We also report in the table differences in acquirer gains between internally 
financed deals and deals involving only partial or no internal financing across governance quartiles.  
We are interested in whether the differences in CARs between acquirers with high FCF and low 
FCF differ between the lowest and the highest governance quartile. More specifically, we examine 
if high free cash flow is associated with lower abnormal returns for bidders and if this relationship 
holds for both well and poorly governed firms. Furthermore, we also test whether internally 
financed deals trigger lower acquirer returns compared to deals that are not or only partially funded 
with cash and whether this is the case across firms with different levels of governance strength.  
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We perform the univariate tests separately for each governance proxy. Panel A provides the 
results for institutional monitoring, which is measured by ownership of the acquiring firm by the 
largest institutional investor and institutional blockhoders. As the panel shows, the differences in 
announcement returns between high-FCF versus low-FCF bidders are significantly negative for 
firms with weak institutional monitoring whereas insignificant for firms with strong institutional 
monitoring. Similarly, bidders that use 100% internal financing gain less than those that do not 
only if they are not well monitored by large institutional investors. These univariate results shed 
some light on the monitoring role played by the largest institutional investor and the institutional 
blockholders on mitigating the agency costs of free cash flows arising from both the accumulation 
of cash flows before the acquisition and the eventual use of these cash flow reserves to finance the 
deal.  
Panels B, C, and D present the results for board monitoring, the market for control, and 
executive incentive strength, respectively. In Panel B, when board monitoring is measured by the 
ratio of the number of independent directors to board size, we find that bidder gains associated 
with high FCF and 100% internal financing are significantly lower only if there is a low proportion 
of independent directors on the board. However, we do not find any consistent pattern of 
significant results for other proxies for corporate governance. That is, our univariate tests do not 
provide evidence of the effectiveness of the market for corporate control and CEO compensation 
structure in improving merger performance of the acquiring firm through the free cash flow 
channel. It is noteworthy that due to lack of data on some of these governance variables our sample 
size is smaller for these tests. In particular, for some subsamples, such as firms with a low 
percentage of independent directors, our sample if especially small and possibly contaminated by 
the governance provisions with respect to board independence brought in by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) and related regulations instituted by stock exchanges. Unfortunately, the time series 
prior to 2001 is too short for us to run meaningful subsample test using pre-SOX data. Our failure 
to find significant results for these subsamples, detailed in subsequent tables, should be interpreted 
with this in mind.  




6.2. Multivariate analysis 
6.2.1. Agency costs of FCF and acquirer returns  
Table 5 tests the first set of hypotheses (H1a and H1b) that bidders that have large free cash 
flows before the acquisition or finance the deal entirely with internal funds generate lower 
abnormal returns. By investigating deals paid completely with equity as well as those paid with 
both cash and equity, our results provide additional evidence to the existing empirical literature on 
the agency costs of free cash flow arising from both the holding of cash flows before the takeover 
and the use of free cash flows to actually finance the deal.  
Model (1) is based on a sample with data on free cash flow and without requiring information 
on sources of funds. The sample for Model (2) is a subsample of pure equity offers. The 
coefficients of the FCF variable in both models are negative and significant at the 99% confidence 
level, suggesting that regardless of whether the acquisition is paid with cash, acquires that hold 
substantial free cash flows experience significantly lower abnormal announcement returns. This 
finding contributes to the extant literature that exclusively examines cash offers (Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1991; Schlingemann, 2004) by showing that the holding of free cash flows before the 
takeover announcement is enough of a signal to trigger lower bidder gains, no matter whether the 
transaction is eventually paid with cash.  
Models (3) and (4) are based on a sample with data on both free cash flow and financing sources. 
The requirement of availability of data on funding sources reduces the sample size by more than 
half. In Model (3), we exclusively examine the use of internal financing, and then we add free cash 
flow in Model (4). Consistent with the result in Model (1), the coefficient on the free cash flow 
variable remains significantly negative in Model (4). The coefficients for the dummy variable for 
the use of 100% internal financing in both Models (3) and (4) are significant and negative, 
indicating that if a firm uses internally generated funds to pay for the takeover, it tends to gain less 
than firms that finance their deals with debt or equity. Again, this finding is in line with that in 
prior research by Vladimirov (2015), which focuses on a sample excluding all-equity offers.  




6.2.2. Institutional monitoring in alleviating agency costs of FCF  
Table 6 provides the analysis of the relation between institutional monitoring, agency costs of 
free cash flow, and acquisition outcomes. We measure institutional monitoring by indicator 
variables for the extreme quartiles of concentrated holdings by the largest institutional investor as 
well as by institutional blockholders controlling at least 5% of the firm’s equity. Specifically, firms 
in the top quartile of institutional ownership concentration are considered well governed, while 
those in the bottom quartile are considered poorly governed.  
Models (1) and (2) test the efficacy of institutional monitoring on mitigating agency costs 
associated with the holding of free cash flows before the announcement of the acquisition. 
Consistent with the results in Table 5, the free cash flow variables on their own are significant and 
negative. The coefficients on the interaction variable of free cash flow and the indicator for low 
concentrated holdings by large institutions are negative and statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level, suggesting that lack of monitoring by large institutional investors worsens the 
negative relation between free cash flow and acquirer returns. On the other hand, the coefficients 
on the interaction variable between free cash flow and the indicator for high institutional ownership 
concentration are positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, suggesting that 
the presence of large institutional investors alleviates the negative market reactions to acquisition 
decisions made by acquiring firms with substantial free cash flows. Moreover, the positive values 
of the coefficients on the interaction term, which are 0.082 in Model (1) and 0.105 in Model (2), 
completely offset the negative values of the coefficients on the free cash flow variable itself, which 
are -0.042 in Model (1) and -0.045 in Model (2). This indicates that the negative impact of free 
cash flow on takeover returns to bidding shareholders can be reversed by effective monitoring of 
large institutional investors. These results are consistent with our hypotheses (H2a and H2b), 
which are developed based on the argument that strong corporate governance serves as an 
important tool in ensuring that managers use corporate resources in the best interest of shareholders.  
Models (3) and (4) focus on the agency costs related to the eventual use of free cash flows to 
fund the acquisition. The major variables of interest have the expected signs. Specifically, the 
interaction terms of internal financing and low institutional ownership concentration are negative, 
and those between internal financing and high institutional ownership concentration are positive. 
However, none of them are significant. 
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In Models (5) and (6), we examine both free cash flows and the use of internal financing. The 
negative coefficients on the interaction of free cash flow and the dummy for low holdings by large 
institutions remain highly significant, whereas the positive coefficients on the interaction of free 
cash flow and the dummy for high holdings are insignificant or only marginally significant. 
Therefore, we conduct a further (unreported) test of whether the coefficients on the two interaction 
terms are significantly different, and the results show that the positive coefficients on the 
interaction of high institutional ownership concentration and free cash flows are significantly 
greater than the negative coefficient on the interaction of low institutional concentrated holdings 
and free cash flows. This is consistent with our hypotheses (H2a and H2b) and further confirms 
the results in Models (1) and (2). And again, all the variables for the interaction between the use 
of internal financing and institutional monitoring are not significant, although the signs are 
consistent with our expectations.  
Overall, the results in Table 6 provide strong evidence that weak institutional monitoring 
increases the agency costs of free cash flow by further decreasing the stock returns to acquiring 
firms with large free cash flows. The results also suggest that strong institutional monitoring 
alleviates the agency problem of free cash flow by cancelling out the negative effect of free cash 
flow on acquirer returns, although the evidence is not as strong as that for weak institutional 
monitoring. Moreover, the insignificant results for the use of internal financing suggest that large 
institutional investors influence the ex-ante financing decision on the holding of cash rather than 
the eventual decision on the use of the cash. An alternative explanation is that the impact of 
institutional monitoring has already been captured by free cash flows, and thus is no longer 
reflected in the use of internal financing.  
[Insert Table 6] 
 
6.2.3. Other governance mechanisms in alleviating agency costs of FCF  
This section examines whether and how other governance metrics, specifically board 
monitoring, the market for corporate control, and executive incentive strength, mitigate the agency 
problem of fee cash flow in acquisitions. The databases from which we collect the data on these 
governance measures, specifically, the RiskMetrics, the IRRC, and the ExcuComp databases, only 
cover the S&P 1500 companies, which are large, more profitable, publicly listed firms. These firms 
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are generally better monitored by the capital markets, and this would potentially bias our results 
against showing significant effects of the individual governance mechanism. 
In the tables in this section, we find no effect of free cash flow on acquirer returns on its own. 
The lack of significance can be attributed to the fact that the bidders in the samples are large firms 
that are well monitored by the capital markets and thus are subject to much less severe agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers over the use of cash resources. 
Table 7 reports the results for board monitoring. The strength of board monitoring is measured 
by indicators for the extreme quartiles of the ratio of independent directors to board size and total 
ownership held by directors on the board. Firms in the top quartile are considered well governed, 
while those in the bottom quartile are considered poorly governed. In Model (1), the interaction 
term between free cash flow and the indicator for a high ratio of independent directors to board 
size is marginally significant and negative, and the interaction of free cash flow and the indicator 
for a low ratio is marginally significant and positive. This suggests that the combination of high 
free cash flow and a small number of independent directors leads to significantly lower abnormal 
announcement returns for acquirers, whereas when the high free cash flow is combined with a 
large number of independent directors, the market instead reacts positively to the acquisition 
announcement. This finding is consistent with the notion that independent directors play an active 
role in monitoring corporate decisions. However, the results no longer hold in Model (5) where 
the sample size is shrunk by half after requiring information on funding sources. For director 
ownership, Models (2) and (6) do not provide significant results to support the effectiveness of 
director ownership in aligning the interest of board members and shareholders through the free 
cash flow channel. Also, in Models (3) to (6), we do not find any significant results for the use of 
internal financing.  
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Table 8 shows the results for the strength of the market for corporate control, which is measured 
by the number of antitakeover provisions in place. Different from other governance proxies, in this 
case, a higher number of the Gompers, Ishiii, and Metrick (2003) antitakeover index (the G Index) 
and the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index (the E Index) indicates lower 
shareholder rights. That is, firms in the bottom quartile of the governance indices have greater 
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shareholder power, while those in the top quartile have weaker governance. For G Index, the 
interaction terms between free cash flow and the dummy for the top quartile are positive in both 
Models (1) and (5) and marginally significant. For E Index, the interaction variables between free 
cash flow and the dummy for the bottom quartile are negative in both Models (2) and (6) and 
marginally significant. The corresponding coefficients for the bottom quartile for the G-index and 
the top quartile for the E-index are insignificant. The marginally significant coefficient estimates 
are counterintuitive in that strong governance appears to be associated with poorer results. 
However, given that the sample sizes are small and that the significance is marginal, we believe 
the results may be driven by a small number of influential observations and therefore interpret the 
results as inconclusive.  
[Insert Table 8] 
 
Table 9 presents the results for CEO compensation structures. We do not find any consistent 
evidence of the effect of either CEO ownership or the value of options granted to the CEO on 
alleviating the agency problem associated with either the holding or the use of free cash flows.  
[Insert Table 9] 
 
6.2.4. Likelihood of diversifying mergers 
In this section, we shift our focus from acquisition outcomes to the likelihood of acquirers 
engaging in diversifying mergers. Specifically, we investigate whether bidders that hold abundant 
cash flows or use internal financing are more likely to take over targets from different industries, 
and whether corporate governance has impact on it. Table 10 reports the results for institutional 
monitoring. The results do not show any consistently significant effects of either free cash flows 
or the use of internal financing on the probability of diversification. And none of the eight 
interaction terms between institutional ownership concentration and free cash flows or the use of 
internal financing are significant. We do not present the results for other governance metrics 
because they also are insignificant.  
It is not surprising that we do not find significant results here. Although theoretic research 
predicts that diversification programs are subject to more serious agency costs (Jensen, 1986; 
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Montgomery, 1994), empirical studies do not document consistent supportive evidence. For 
example, Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) report that diversification is not 
necessarily correlated with lower firm value and it can even positively affect firm value.  
[Insert Table 10] 
 
7. Robustness tests 
In this section, we conduct two robustness tests. First, we test if our results are robust to the 
acquirer abnormal return over an expanded event window of twenty-one days around the merger 
announcement. Table 11 presents the results for the relation between bidder CARs (-10, +10), free 
cash flow/ the use of internal financing, and characteristics of institutional investors. Overall, the 
results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6. In Models (1), (2), (5), and (6), the variables 
for free cash flow on its own are significantly negative, and the interaction variables between free 
cash flow and the indicator for the bottom quartile of both the two measures of institutional 
monitoring are negative and significant at the 99% confidence level. The interaction terms between 
free cash flow and the indicator for high institutional blockholdings are significantly positive in 
both Model (2) and Model (6), and the values of the coefficients reveal that the presence of large 
institutional blockholders can alter the negative relationship between free cash flow and acquirer 
abnormal returns. However, the interaction of free cash flow and the dummy for high holdings by 
the single largest institutional investors does not show any significant results. And the results for 
the use of internal financing remain insignificant as in Table 6.   
[Insert Table 11] 
Second, in order to rule out the possibility of a selection bias, we re-construct the indicators for 
strong and weak governance by sorting all firms in the governance database, rather than only firms 
in the acquisition sample, into quartiles based on the value of the corresponding governance 
measure. Table 12 reports the results for institutional ownership concentration. Again, the results 
are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6. Across all specifications, the free cash flow variable 
itself is significantly negative. In Models (1) and (5), the interaction of free cash flows and the 
indicator for strong governance is positive and significant at the 99% confidence level. In Models 
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(2) and (6), the interaction of free cash flows and the dummy for weak governance is significantly 
negative.  
[Insert Table 12] 
We do not display the results of robustness tests for other governance proxies because on the 
whole those results remain insignificant as in the main tables.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In this study, we provide a complete and detailed picture of the relations among agency costs 
of free cash flow, corporate governance structures, and merger performance of acquirers. In so 
doing, we provide a fresh perspective on the manner in which corporate governance impacts the 
relation between free cash flows and merger performance. 
First, we document a negative impact of free cash flow on bidder abnormal announcement 
returns by examining a comprehensive sample consisting of both cash and equity transactions as 
well as a subsample of pure equity offers. This finding provides additional evidence to the free 
cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and more importantly, shows that the holding of free cash 
flows by the acquirer preceding the acquisition announcement is enough of a signal to trigger less 
favorable market reactions even if the deal is not paid with internal funds. Our findings indicate 
that the market incorporates into share price reactions the likelihood of unused excess cash being 
misused in the future. We also find that the use of internally generated funds to finance the takeover 
further decreases bidder returns in addition to the negative effect of free cash flow.  
Second, we find that acquisitions made by bidders holding substantial free cash flows are valued 
less by the market only if the bidder is poorly monitored by large institutional investors. 
Specifically, the negative relation between free cash flows and acquirer abnormal announcement 
returns is reversed if the bidder is well monitored by large institutional shareholders and is more 
pronounced if the bidder lacks institutional monitoring. Prior literature finds little evidence that 
institutional activism can directly improve bidder stock returns around the merger announcement. 
Our findings indicate there is more nuance to the relation between institutional shareholding and 
bidder returns than was captured by earlier studies.  
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Third, we investigate multiple other governance measures, including board composition, 
indices of shareholder rights constructed based on the number of antitakeover provisions, and CEO 
compensation structures. However, we do not find enough evidence to conclude that these 
corporate governance mechanisms also significantly mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow in 
the acquisition process. This final result comes with the caveat that our sample was constrained by 
the availability of data on these measures of governance for our sample of acquirers. We look 
forward to future research that can address this issue and so provide a comprehensive test of the 




The following table presents variable definitions. Data sources are given in brackets.  
Variable Definition 
CAR (-5, +5) 
Eleven-day cumulative abnormal stock returns around bid announcements 
calculated using the CAPM over the estimation period of (-200, -60) before the 
announcement date (0) [CRSP] 
Proxies for agency costs of FCF 
FCF 
Free cash flow defined as operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) 
minus interest expenses (XINT), tax expenses (TXT), and preferred and 
common dividends (DVT) normalized by book value of total assets (AT) 
[Compustat] 
CASH_FIN 
A dummy equal to one if the takeover deal is entirely financed with internal 
funds, zero otherwise [SDC] 
Proxies for corporate governance 
INST_TOP1_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the bottom quartile of holdings 
by the largest institutional investor, zero otherwise [Form 13F] 
INST_TOP1_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the top quartile of holdings by 
the largest institutional investor, zero otherwise [Form 13F] 
INST_BLOCK_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the bottom quartile of total 
ownership by institutional investors that hold more than 5% of the firm’s 
shares, zero otherwise [Form 13F] 
INST_BLOCK_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the top quartile of total 
ownership by institutional investors that hold more than 5% of the firm’s 
shares, zero otherwise [Form 13F] 
INDP_DIR_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the bottom quartile of the 
fraction of independent directors on the board, zero otherwise [RiskMetrics] 
INDP_DIR_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the top quartile of the fraction 
of independent directors on the board, zero otherwise [RiskMetrics] 
DIR_OWN_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the bottom quartile of total 
stock ownership by all the directors on the board, zero otherwise [RiskMetrics] 
DIR_OWN_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the top quartile of total stock 
ownership by all the directors on the board, zero otherwise [RiskMetrics] 
GINDEX_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the bottom quartile of the 
Gompers, Ishiii, and Metrick (2003) antitakeover index, zero otherwise [IRRC] 
GINDEX_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the top quartile of the Gompers, 
Ishiii, and Metrick (2003) antitakeover index, zero otherwise [IRRC] 
EINDEX_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the bottom quartile of the 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index, zero otherwise 
[IRRC] 
EINDEX_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is within the top quartile of the Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index, zero otherwise [IRRC] 
EXECU_OWN_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is in the bottom quartile of CEO 
ownership (SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCT/ 100), zero otherwise 
[ExecuComp] 
EXECU_OWN_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is in the top quartile of CEO ownership 
(SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCT/ 100), zero otherwise [ExecuComp] 
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EXECU_OPT_Q1 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is in the bottom quartile of the Black-
Scholes value of stock options awarded to CEOs 
(OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE) scaled by total compensation (TDC1), 
zero otherwise [ExecuComp] 
EXECU_OPT_Q4 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is in the bottom quartile of the Black-
Scholes value of stock options awarded to CEOs 
(OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE) scaled by total compensation (TDC1), 
zero otherwise [ExecuComp] 
Acquirer characteristics 
LEV 
Leverage defined as book value of debts (DLC +DLTT) over book value of 
assets (PRCC_F * CSHO +AT – CEQ) [Compustat] 
Q 
Tobin’s Q defined as market value of assets (PRCC_F * CSHO +AT – CEQ) 
over book value of assets (AT) [Compustat] 
SIZE 
Firm size defined as the logarithm of book value of total assets (AT) 
[Compustat] 
Deal characteristics 
CASH_PER Percentage of cash payment [SDC] 
PRV A dummy equal to one if the target is privately held, zero otherwise [SDC] 
SUB A dummy equal to one if the target is a subsidiary, zero otherwise [SDC] 
DIVERS 
A dummy equal to one if the 2-digit SIC codes are different for the acquirer and 
the target, zero otherwise [SDC] 
HOSTILE A dummy equal to one if the deal is hostile, zero otherwise [SDC] 
TENDER_OFFER A dummy equal to one if the deal is a tender offer, zero otherwise [SDC] 
DEAL_SIZE 
Transaction value over market value of the bidder’s assets (PRCC_F * CSHO 




We obtain PERMNOs from the dataset DSENAMES of CRSP for each acquirer using the 
methodology as in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014).  
The DSENAMES database contains PERMNO, the start and end dates during which the 
PERMNO is valid, and four firm identifiers, including CUSIP, historic CUSIP (NCUSIP), 
TICKER, and the company name (COMNAM). Our SDC sample contains the acquirer’s 6-digit 
CUSIP, the acquirer’s ticker, the bidder’s name, and the bid announcement date. We match the 
SDC sample separately and sequentially with each of the firm identifiers of DESNAMES, while 
requiring the announcement date to be between the start date and the end date.  
The procedure of obtaining PERMNOs is tabulated in the table below. As the table shows, 
matching the acquirer CUSIP of SDC with the 6-digit NCUSIP of CRSP yields a match for 11,577 
of the 12,979 observations. For the remaining 1,402 observations, we match using 6-digit CUSIP 
of CRSP. And we obtain a match for 45 observations. For the remaining 1,357 observations, we 
match the acquirer ticker of SDC with TICKER of CRSP and obtain a match for 187 observations. 
Then we match the 1,170 remaining observations using the company name. This yields a match 
for 15 observations. Overall, we find a matching PERMNO for 11,824 of the 12,979 observations.  
In order to obtain GVKEYs, we match the 11,824 observations that have available PERMNOs 
with the CRSP-Compustat combined database. Again, we require the announcement date to be 
between the start date and the end date. This procedure finds a match for 11,506 observations.  
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 Matching Criteria Observations  
SDC Sample    12,979 
To obtain PERMNO 
 CRSP. 6-digit NCUSIP = SDC. Acquirer CUSIP 
 Start Date <= Announcement Date <= End Date 
11,577  
 CRSP. 6-digit CUSIP = SDC. Acquirer CUSIP 
 Start Date <= Announcement Date <= End Date 
45  
 CRSP. TICKER = SDC. Acquirer TICKER 
 Start Date <= Announcement Date <= End Date 
187  
 CRSP. Company Name = SDC. Company Name 
 Start Date <= Announcement Date <= End Date 
15  
  11,824 
To Obtain GVKEY 
 CRSP-SDC. PERMNO = CRSP-Compustat. PERMNO 
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Construction of the sample with stock price data and accounting data 
Panel A: SDC sample selection 
 Screening Criteria 
Observations 
Remaining 
Date Announced 01/01/1990 – 12/31/2016  
Acquirer and Target Nation US 241,814 
Acquirer Public Status Public 118,799 
Target Public Status Public, Private, Subsidiary 117,758 
Acquirer Industry 
Excluding: 
Financial Firms (SIC 6000-6999), Utilities (SIC 
4900-4999) 
86,332 
Deal Status Completed 60,827 
Deal Value >= $1 million 30,097 
% Owned before < 50  
% Owned after = 100 25,201 
Deal Type 
Excluding: 
Leveraged Buyouts, Spinoffs, Recapitalizations, 
Self-Tenders, Repurchases, Privatizations 
25,124 
Form of the Deal Merger, Acquisition of Assets 24,579 
Method of Payment Percentage of Cash + Percentage of Equity = 100% 12,979 
 
Panel B: Data on CARs, FCFs, and control variables 
 Observations  
SDC Sample 12,979 
With available PERMNOs and GVKEYs 11,506 
Excluding multiple-class shares 11,340 
Excluding consecutive bids announced by the same acquirer within 200 days 9,112 
With available cumulative abnormal returns around announcements 8,143 




Construction of final samples with data on governance proxies 
Panel A: Data on various governance measures and all variables in Panel B of Table 1 
Proxy for governance  Source of data Period covered Observations  
Institutional monitoring  Form 13F 1990 - 2016 6,915 
Board monitoring  RiskMetrics 1996 - 2016 1,232 
Antitakeover Provisions IRRC 1990 - 2006 1,553 
CEO incentive strength ExecuComp 1992 - 2016 3,151 
 
Panel B: Data on sources of financing and all variables in Panel A 
Proxy for governance Source of data Period covered Observations 
Institutional monitoring Form 13F 1990 - 2016 3,341 
Board monitoring RiskMetrics 1996 - 2016 682 
Antitakeover Provisions IRRC 1990 - 2006 774 





Panel A presents description of acquirer announcement returns and acquiring-firm and deal characteristics 
for our sample of completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions between 1990 and 2016. Panel B shows the 
summary statistics on different governance measures for the four subsamples. Both panels provide mean, 
median, 25th and 75th percentiles, and the number of non-missing observations for each variable. Definitions 
of the variables are presented in Appendix 1.  
Panel A: Bidder returns, free cash flows, and control variables  
 Mean Median p25 p75 N 
CAR (-5, +5) 0.018 0.006 -0.048 0.071 7153 
FCF 0.04 0.081 0.037 0.121 7153 
LEV 0.209 0.171 0.025 0.327 7153 
Q 2.531 1.826 1.344 2.749 7153 
SIZE 5.979 5.943 4.443 7.422 7153 
CASH_PER 64.003 100 0 100 7153 
PRV 0.49 0 0 1 7153 
SUB 0.302 0 0 1 7153 
DIVERS 0.408 0 0 1 7153 
HOSTILE 0.002 0 0 0 7153 
TENDER_OFFER 0.051 0 0 0 7153 
DEAL_SIZE 0.23 0.062 0.021 0.177 7153 
 
Panel B: Governance measures 
 Mean Median p25 p75 N 
INST_TOP1 .086 .079 .05 .108 6915 
INST_BLOCK .152 .127 0 .236 6915 
INDP_DIR .681 .714 .571 .818 1232 
DIR_OWN .075 .02 .005 .073 1232 
GINDEX 8.998 9 7 11 1553 
EINDEX 2.021 2 1 3 1553 
EXECU_OWN .02 .002 0 .012 3151 




Univariate tests of differences in acquirer CARs (-5, +5) across levels of agency costs of FCF and 
governance strength 
This table reports univariate comparisons of bidder abnormal returns by levels of the FCF agency problem 
across quartiles of each corporate governance proxy. The numbers for the combined High and Low FCF do 
not add up to the same as the ones for 100% internal financing since we separate the sample for free cash 
flow and the sample for the use of internal financing to eliminate any potential bias due to the large loss of 
observations by requiring data on sources of funds. The acquirer abnormal return is the cumulative 
abnormal return estimated from five days before the bid announcement to five days after the announcement. 
The FCF agency problem is proxied by FCF and the use of internal financing. FCF is defined as operating 
income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, and total dividends, scaled by the book value of 
total assets, for the fiscal year before the acquisition announcement. Acquiring firms with high (low) FCF 
are those ranked within the top (bottom) quartile of free cash flows. 100% internal financing refers to deals 
that are entirely financed with internally generated funds. Each panel presents the results for one aspect of 
corporate governance. Definitions of the governance variables are displayed in Appendix 1. Bidding firms 
with high (low) levels of a governance measure are those ranked in the top (bottom) quartile of that 
governance measure. Each cell includes the mean value of the acquirer CAR (-5, +5), the t-value for the 
mean, and the number of non-missing observations. For the comparison of means, we report the mean 
different and the t-statistic assuming unequal variances in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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N = 398 
0.0598*** 
(5.60) 





N = 50 
0.0476*** 
(5.81) 






N = 412 
0.0091 
(1.03) 





N = 49 
0.0196*** 
(3.75) 
N = 730 
-0.0074 
(-0.71) 




N = 399 
0.0591*** 
(5.56) 





N = 50 
0.0474*** 
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N = 398 
0.0109 
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N = 51 
0.0195*** 
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N = 76 
0.0345* 
(1.98) 





N = 15 
0.0291** 
(2.42) 






N = 68 
-0.0052 
(-0.18) 





N = 25 
0.0092 
(1.27) 
N = 164 
0.0096 
(0.88) 




N = 93 
0.0005 
(0.03) 





N = 11 
-0.0017 
(-0.19) 






N = 75 
0.0265 
(1.28) 





N = 18 
0.0188* 
(1.68) 


























N = 120 
0.0225 
(0.0225) 





N = 24 
0.0073 
(0.68) 






N = 75 
-0.0280* 
(-2.05) 





N = 13 
0.0004 
(0.04) 







N = 145 
0.0343* 
(1.86) 





N = 25 
0.0086 
(0.88) 






N = 47 
-0.0105 
(-0.48) 





N = 9 
-0.0052 
(-0.45) 



























N = 365 
0.0027 
(0.20) 





N = 56 
0.0037 
(0.73) 






N = 278 
-0.0054 
(-0.42) 





N = 24 
0.0107 
(1.49) 
N = 319 
0.0101 
(0.63) 




N = 469 
-0.0096 
(-0.84) 





N = 88 
0.0138*** 
(3.16) 






N = 270 
-0.0086 
(-0.58) 





N = 27 
-0.0098 
(-1.35) 






Regressions of bidder CARs (-5, +5) on free cash flow and the use of internal financing  
This table presents the results of regressing acquirer returns on free cash flows and the use of internal 
financing. The acquirer return is the eleven-day cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition 
announcement. FCF is measured as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, 
and total dividends, scaled by the book value of total assets, at the end of the fiscal year before the 
acquisition announcement. CASH_FIN denotes a dummy that takes a value of one for transactions that are 
entirely financed with internal funds, and zero otherwise. Definitions of control variables are specified in 
Appendix 1. Model (1) is based on a sample with data on FCF, Model (2) is based on a subsample of pure 
equity offers, and Models (3) and (4) are based on a sample with data on both FCF and CASH_FIN. t-
statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FCF -0.070*** -0.088***  -0.082*** 
 (-8.57) (-6.13)  (-7.27) 
CASH_FIN   -0.027** -0.028** 
   (-1.96) (-2.09) 
LEV 0.025** 0.019 0.027* 0.018 
 (2.55) (0.74) (1.67) (1.10) 
Q -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (-8.34) (-5.01) (-5.81) (-6.28) 
SIZE -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.010*** 
 (-6.26) (-3.95) (-8.51) (-5.45) 
CASH_PER -0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (-0.71)  (0.70) (1.61) 
PRV 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 (5.27) (3.79) (4.42) (4.64) 
SUB 0.037*** 0.068*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (6.17) (4.02) (5.04) (5.00) 
DIVERS 0.005 0.013 0.007 0.007 
 (1.28) (1.26) (1.11) (1.03) 
HOSTILE -0.040 0.003 -0.030 -0.035 
 (-1.05) (0.03) (-0.59) (-0.70) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.042*** 0.028 0.053*** 0.049*** 
 (4.47) (0.48) (3.73) (3.44) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (5.25) (2.32) (3.91) (3.92) 
Constant 0.073 -0.065 -0.036 -0.054 
 (0.84) (-0.44) (-0.29) (-0.43) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7153 2062 3483 3483 




Regressions of bidder CARs (-5, +5) on free cash flow, internal financing, and institutional monitoring 
This table reports the results of the regressions of acquirer returns on free cash flow, internal financing, and 
institutional ownership concentration. The acquirer return is the eleven-day cumulative abnormal return 
around the takeover announcement date. The major variables of interest are eight interaction terms: FCF * 
INST_TOP1_Q1, FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4, FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, 
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1, CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q4, CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4, and 
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4. FCF is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest 
expenses, taxes and total dividends scaled by book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
the acquisition announcement. CASH_FIN is a dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed with 
internally generated funds, and zero otherwise. INST_TOP1_Q1 (INST_TOP1_Q4) is an indicator variable 
for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the level of ownership controlled by the single largest 
institutional investor. INST_BLOCK_Q1 (INST_BLOCK_Q4) is a dummy variable for bidders within the 
bottom (top) quartile of the level of total ownership controlled by the institutions holding at least 5% of the 
firm’s shares. Definitions of control variables are presented in Appendix 1. Models (1) and (2) employ the 
sample with data on FCF, while Models (3) through (6) use a subset of observations for which information 
on financing sources is available. t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FCF -0.042** -0.045***   -0.053** -0.056*** 
 (-2.57) (-2.80)   (-2.41) (-2.58) 
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q1 -0.058***    -0.068***  
 (-3.10)    (-2.75)  
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4 0.082***    0.068  
 (2.65)    (1.51)  
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q1  -0.056***    -0.066*** 
  (-3.05)    (-2.68) 
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4  0.105***    0.089* 
  (3.18)    (1.87) 
CASH_FIN   -0.027 -0.026 -0.029* -0.029 
   (-1.51) (-1.46) (-1.66) (-1.60) 
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1   -0.023  -0.012  
   (-0.74)  (-0.40)  
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q4   0.024  0.022  
   (0.78)  (0.70)  
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q1    -0.024  -0.014 
    (-0.76)  (-0.44) 
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4    0.022  0.021 
    (0.71)  (0.67) 
INST_TOP1_Q1 0.014***  0.018**  0.012  
 (3.01)  (2.37)  (1.59)  
INST_TOP1_Q4 -0.005  -0.001  -0.004  
 (-1.01)  (-0.14)  (-0.52)  
INST_BLOCK_Q1  0.015***  0.020**  0.014* 
  (3.16)  (2.54)  (1.80) 
INST_BLOCK_Q4  -0.003  0.004  -0.000 
  (-0.67)  (0.44)  (-0.03) 
LEV 0.017* 0.017* 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.002 
 (1.77) (1.73) (0.81) (0.79) (0.13) (0.13) 
Q -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 45 
 (-8.04) (-8.04) (-5.59) (-5.54) (-6.05) (-6.02) 
SIZE -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-4.17) (-4.03) (-6.22) (-6.20) (-3.55) (-3.45) 
CASH_PER -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.48) (-0.45) (0.89) (0.87) (1.51) (1.49) 
PRV 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (6.04) (6.09) (5.02) (5.01) (5.20) (5.23) 
SUB 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (6.82) (6.85) (5.50) (5.48) (5.55) (5.57) 
DIVERS 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (1.46) (1.45) (1.53) (1.52) (1.53) (1.53) 
HOSTILE -0.042 -0.044 -0.036 -0.039 -0.040 -0.044 
 (-1.12) (-1.17) (-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.83) (-0.90) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 
 (4.49) (4.58) (3.78) (3.85) (3.48) (3.63) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (8.34) (8.34) (6.15) (6.16) (5.98) (5.99) 
Constant 0.048 0.049 -0.062 -0.062 -0.083 -0.081 
 (0.55) (0.57) (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.67) (-0.66) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6915 6915 3341 3341 3341 3341 




Regressions of bidder CARs (-5, +5) on free cash flow, internal financing, and board monitoring 
This table reports the results of the regressions of acquirer returns on free cash flow, internal financing, and 
board characteristics. The acquirer return is the eleven-day cumulative abnormal return around the takeover 
announcement date. The major variables of interest are eight interaction terms: FCF * INDP_DIR_Q1, FCF 
* INDP_DIR_Q4, FCF * DIR_OWN_Q4, FCF * DIR_OWN_Q4, CASH_FIN * INDP_DIR_Q1, 
CASH_FIN * INDP_DIR_Q4, CASH_FIN * DIR_OWN_Q4, and CASH_FIN * DIR_OWN_Q4. FCF is 
defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes and total dividends scaled 
by book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. CASH_FIN 
is a dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed with internally generated funds, and zero otherwise. 
INDP_DIR_Q1 (INDP_DIR_Q4) is an indicator variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the 
ratio of independent directors to board size. DIR_OWN_Q1 (DIR_OWN_Q4) is a dummy variable for 
bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of total ownership controlled by directors on the board. Definitions 
of control variables are presented in Appendix 1. Models (1) and (2) employ the sample with data on FCF, 
while Models (3) through (6) use a subset of observations for which information on financing sources is 
available. t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FCF 0.027 -0.009   0.004 0.005 
 (0.50) (-0.19)   (0.05) (0.08) 
FCF * INDP_DIR_Q1 -0.133*    -0.071  
 (-1.91)    (-0.72)  
FCF * INDP_DIR_Q4 0.205*    0.246  
 (1.71)    (1.39)  
FCF * DIR_OWN_Q1  0.057    0.011 
  (0.63)    (0.09) 
FCF * DIR_OWN_Q4  -0.087    -0.094 
  (-1.15)    (-0.90) 
CASH_FIN   -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 
   (-0.34) (-0.50) (-0.35) (-0.51) 
CASH_FIN * INDP_DIR_Q1   -0.057  -0.055  
   (-1.45)  (-1.37)  
CASH_FIN * INDP_DIR_Q4   0.019  0.018  
   (0.57)  (0.54)  
CASH_FIN * DIR_OWN_Q1    0.025  0.024 
    (0.58)  (0.57) 
CASH_FIN * DIR_OWN_Q4    -0.017  -0.013 
    (-0.47)  (-0.35) 
INDP_DIR_Q1 0.019**  0.030**  0.033**  
 (2.13)  (2.28)  (2.27)  
INDP_DIR_Q4 -0.012  0.006  -0.017  
 (-0.88)  (0.47)  (-0.84)  
DIR_OWN_Q1  -0.006  -0.018  -0.019 
  (-0.56)  (-1.13)  (-0.99) 
DIR_OWN_Q4  0.014  0.009  0.016 
  (1.44)  (0.74)  (1.09) 
LEV 0.033* 0.032* 0.018 0.022 0.019 0.023 
 (1.81) (1.74) (0.66) (0.80) (0.70) (0.81) 
Q -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (-4.50) (-4.76) (-3.74) (-4.01) (-3.64) (-3.96) 
 47 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** 
 (-2.69) (-2.61) (-2.23) (-2.20) (-2.02) (-2.07) 
CASH_PER 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.29) (0.32) (-0.62) (-0.88) (-0.52) (-0.72) 
PRV 0.016* 0.017** 0.025* 0.025* 0.024* 0.025* 
 (1.93) (2.04) (1.96) (1.94) (1.83) (1.90) 
SUB 0.020** 0.022** 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.021 
 (2.25) (2.45) (1.58) (1.56) (1.41) (1.51) 
DIVERS 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.26) (0.23) (-0.03) (-0.33) (-0.04) (-0.34) 
HOSTILE -0.026 -0.029 -0.035 -0.040 -0.033 -0.039 
 (-0.35) (-0.39) (-0.29) (-0.33) (-0.28) (-0.33) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.013 0.014 0.033* 0.030 0.030 0.029 
 (1.10) (1.17) (1.77) (1.64) (1.64) (1.57) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.014 
 (1.02) (1.02) (0.93) (0.81) (0.97) (0.88) 
Constant 0.020 0.031 0.033 0.066 0.030 0.064 
 (0.45) (0.68) (0.57) (1.10) (0.51) (1.05) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1232 1232 682 682 682 682 




Regressions of bidder CARs (-5, +5) on free cash flow, internal financing, and governance indices 
This table reports the results of the regressions of acquirer returns on free cash flow, internal financing, and 
the number of antitakeover provisions. The acquirer return is the eleven-day cumulative abnormal return 
around the takeover announcement date. The major variables of interest are eight interaction terms: FCF * 
GINDEX_Q1, FCF * GINDEX_Q4, FCF * EINDEX_Q4, FCF * EINDEX_Q4, CASH_FIN * 
GINDEX_Q1, CASH_FIN * GINDEX_Q4, CASH_FIN * EINDEX_Q4, and CASH_FIN * EINDEX_Q4. 
FCF is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes and total dividends 
scaled by book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. 
CASH_FIN is a dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed with internally generated funds, and zero 
otherwise. GINDEX_Q1 (GINDEX_Q4) is an indicator variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile 
of the Gompers, Ishiii, and Metrick (2003) antitakeover index. EINDEX_Q1 (EINDEX_Q4) is a dummy 
variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
entrenchment index. Definitions of control variables are presented in Appendix 1. Models (1) and (2) 
employ the sample with data on FCF, while Models (3) through (6) use a subset of observations for which 
information on financing sources is available. t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FCF -0.001 0.044   0.001 0.067 
 (-0.04) (1.00)   (0.02) (1.09) 
FCF * GINDEX_Q1 -0.054    -0.056  
 (-1.27)    (-1.04)  
FCF * GINDEX_Q4 0.195*    0.486**  
 (1.65)    (2.11)  
FCF * EINDEX_Q1  -0.104**    -0.138* 
  (-2.03)    (-1.96) 
FCF * EINDEX_Q4  -0.050    -0.054 
  (-0.82)    (-0.68) 
CASH_FIN   0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.007 
   (0.21) (-0.32) (0.20) (-0.41) 
CASH_FIN * GINDEX_Q1   -0.014  -0.012  
   (-0.45)  (-0.40)  
CASH_FIN * GINDEX_Q4   -0.020  -0.012  
   (-0.53)  (-0.32)  
CASH_FIN * EINDEX_Q1    0.004  0.007 
    (0.15)  (0.25) 
CASH_FIN * EINDEX_Q4    0.015  0.015 
    (0.34)  (0.34) 
GINDEX_Q1 0.005  0.008  0.012  
 (0.76)  (0.69)  (1.00)  
GINDEX_Q4 -0.020  0.003  -0.043*  
 (-1.55)  (0.26)  (-1.71)  
EINDEX_Q1  0.013*  0.006  0.016 
  (1.85)  (0.59)  (1.36) 
EINDEX_Q4  -0.005  -0.019  -0.014 
  (-0.54)  (-1.40)  (-0.98) 
LEV 0.041** 0.041** 0.059** 0.061** 0.056** 0.048* 
 (2.51) (2.47) (2.28) (2.36) (2.12) (1.82) 
Q -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-4.26) (-4.39) (-3.47) (-3.60) (-3.65) (-3.81) 
 49 
SIZE -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** 
 (-2.63) (-2.84) (-2.18) (-2.34) (-1.97) (-2.24) 
CASH_PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.78) (0.73) (0.61) (0.64) (0.37) (0.48) 
PRV 0.018** 0.017** 0.023* 0.023** 0.025** 0.024** 
 (2.50) (2.39) (1.96) (1.98) (2.11) (2.02) 
SUB 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.025* 0.025* 0.026* 0.027* 
 (2.63) (2.60) (1.80) (1.82) (1.87) (1.90) 
DIVERS 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (0.64) (0.68) (0.54) (0.56) (0.57) (0.64) 
HOSTILE -0.019 -0.017 -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 
 (-0.45) (-0.40) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.25) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.016 0.015 0.022 0.021 0.025 0.023 
 (1.52) (1.43) (1.28) (1.24) (1.46) (1.31) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.030** 0.028** 0.033* 0.033* 0.032* 0.029 
 (2.09) (2.00) (1.74) (1.74) (1.69) (1.54) 
Constant -0.109 -0.092 -0.124 -0.103 -0.153 -0.103 
 (-1.15) (-0.97) (-1.09) (-0.91) (-1.33) (-0.91) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1553 1553 774 774 774 774 




Regressions of bidder CARs (-5, +5) on free cash flow, internal financing, and CEO compensation 
structures 
This table reports the results of the regressions of acquirer returns on free cash flow, internal financing, and 
CEO compensation characteristics. The acquirer return is the eleven-day cumulative abnormal return 
around the takeover announcement date. The major variables of interest are eight interaction terms: FCF * 
EXECU_OWN_Q1, FCF * EXECU_OWN_Q4, FCF * EXECU_OPT_Q4, FCF * EXECU_OPT_Q4, 
CASH_FIN * EXECU_OWN_Q1, CASH_FIN * EXECU_OWN_Q4, CASH_FIN * EXECU_OPT_Q4, 
and CASH_FIN * EXECU_OPT_Q4. FCF is defined as operating income before depreciation minus 
interest expenses, taxes and total dividends scaled by book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the acquisition announcement. CASH_FIN is a dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed 
with internally generated funds, and zero otherwise. EXECU_OWN_Q1 (EXECU_OWN_Q4) is an 
indicator variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of CEO ownership. EXECU_OPT_Q1 
(EXECU_OPT_Q4) is a dummy variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the value of options 
awarded to the CEO. Definitions of control variables are presented in Appendix 1. Models (1) and (2) 
employ the sample with data on FCF, while Models (3) through (6) use a subset of observations for which 
information on financing sources is available. t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FCF 0.029 -0.045   -0.041 -0.078 
 (0.88) (-0.64)   (-0.73) (-0.78) 
FCF * EXECU_OWN_Q1 -0.009    0.043  
 (-0.17)    (0.56)  
FCF * EXECU_OWN_Q4 0.056    0.176**  
 (1.00)    (2.03)  
FCF * EXECU_OPT_Q1  0.107    0.128 
  (1.42)    (1.15) 
FCF * EXECU_OPT_Q4  0.079    0.094 
  (1.01)    (0.85) 
CASH_FIN   -0.008 -0.026 -0.007 -0.026 
   (-0.53) (-1.20) (-0.47) (-1.18) 
CASH_FIN * EXECU_OWN_Q1   -0.011  -0.012  
   (-0.51)  (-0.55)  
CASH_FIN * EXECU_OWN_Q4   -0.001  -0.003  
   (-0.05)  (-0.11)  
CASH_FIN * EXECU_OPT_Q1    0.011  0.010 
    (0.43)  (0.41) 
CASH_FIN * EXECU_OPT_Q4    0.039  0.038 
    (1.28)  (1.26) 
EXECU_OWN_Q1 0.003  0.006  0.003  
 (0.48)  (0.71)  (0.23)  
EXECU_OWN_Q4 0.003  0.006  -0.011  
 (0.48)  (0.67)  (-0.92)  
EXECU_OPT_Q1  -0.013  -0.002  -0.015 
  (-1.38)  (-0.16)  (-0.98) 
EXECU_OPT_Q4  -0.012  -0.010  -0.019 
  (-1.25)  (-1.06)  (-1.35) 
LEV 0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.39) (0.30) (-0.07) (-0.09) (0.15) (-0.08) 
Q -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
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 (-5.25) (-4.95) (-3.47) (-3.32) (-3.41) (-3.33) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (-3.07) (-3.48) (-2.36) (-2.50) (-2.37) (-2.56) 
CASH_PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.35) (0.33) (0.25) (0.13) (0.22) (-0.00) 
PRV 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 (3.79) (3.79) (4.18) (4.19) (4.25) (4.15) 
SUB 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (4.53) (4.54) (4.12) (4.12) (4.16) (4.15) 
DIVERS -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.72) (-0.69) (-1.11) (-1.04) (-1.01) (-0.99) 
HOSTILE -0.031 -0.032 -0.031 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 
 (-1.14) (-1.17) (-0.96) (-0.85) (-0.92) (-0.85) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.018** 0.018** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (2.20) (2.20) (2.74) (2.71) (2.73) (2.76) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.97) (0.97) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.14) 
Constant 0.056 0.077 0.072 0.082 0.067 0.092 
 (0.93) (1.27) (0.86) (0.98) (0.81) (1.10) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3151 3151 1346 1346 1346 1346 




Logit regressions of the dummy for diversifying mergers on free cash flows, internal financing, and 
institutional monitoring  
This table reports the results of the logit regressions of the dummy for diversifying acquisitions on free cash 
flow, internal financing, and institutional ownership concentration. The dependent variable is an indicator 
that equals one if the acquirer and the target do not share the same 2-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. 
The major variables of interest are eight interaction terms: FCF * INST_TOP1_Q1, FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4, 
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1, CASH_FIN * 
INST_TOP1_Q4, CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4, and CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4. FCF is 
defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes and total dividends scaled 
by book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. CASH_FIN 
is a dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed with internally generated funds, and zero otherwise. 
INST_TOP1_Q1 (INST_TOP1_Q4) is an indicator variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of 
the level of ownership controlled by the single largest institutional investor. INST_BLOCK_Q1 
(INST_BLOCK_Q4) is a dummy variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the level of total 
ownership controlled by the institutions holding at least 5% of the firm’s shares. Definitions of control 
variables are presented in Appendix 1. Models (1) and (2) employ the sample with data on FCF, while 
Models (3) through (6) use a subset of observations for which information on financing sources is available. 
t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FCF 0.000 -0.088   -0.037 0.005 
 (0.00) (-0.38)   (-0.14) (0.02) 
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q1 -0.202    -0.001  
 (-0.74)    (-0.00)  
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4 -0.404    -0.195  
 (-0.87)    (-0.34)  
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q1  -0.110    -0.038 
  (-0.42)    (-0.12) 
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4  -0.045    -0.473 
  (-0.09)    (-0.76) 
CASH_FIN   0.478** 0.281 0.475** 0.277 
   (2.15) (1.26) (2.14) (1.24) 
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1   -0.615  -0.616  
   (-1.59)  (-1.59)  
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q4   -0.492  -0.484  
   (-1.25)  (-1.23)  
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q1    -0.421  -0.421 
    (-1.09)  (-1.09) 
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4    0.145  0.150 
    (0.37)  (0.38) 
INST_TOP1_Q1 0.173**  0.148  0.147  
 (2.54)  (1.53)  (1.51)  
INST_TOP1_Q4 -0.036  0.118  0.129  
 (-0.51)  (1.15)  (1.20)  
INST_BLOCK_Q1  0.159**  0.093  0.094 
  (2.35)  (0.97)  (0.98) 
INST_BLOCK_Q4  -0.091  -0.044  -0.013 
  (-1.21)  (-0.41)  (-0.11) 
LEV -0.050 -0.048 0.127 0.135 0.124 0.134 
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 (-0.34) (-0.33) (0.62) (0.66) (0.60) (0.65) 
Q 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.06) (-0.03) (0.32) (0.28) (0.31) (0.30) 
SIZE 0.043*** 0.042*** -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 (2.65) (2.59) (-0.11) (-0.12) (0.01) (-0.03) 
CASH_PER -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.32) (-1.31) (-1.62) (-1.59) (-1.53) (-1.50) 
PRV 0.396*** 0.394*** 0.480*** 0.479*** 0.481*** 0.478*** 
 (4.90) (4.88) (4.69) (4.67) (4.70) (4.66) 
SUB 0.274*** 0.273*** 0.339*** 0.343*** 0.338*** 0.339*** 
 (3.05) (3.04) (2.66) (2.69) (2.64) (2.65) 
HOSTILE 0.363 0.385 0.807 0.844 0.804 0.846 
 (0.65) (0.69) (1.28) (1.34) (1.28) (1.34) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.719*** 0.706*** 0.929*** 0.935*** 0.927*** 0.929*** 
 (5.27) (5.18) (5.27) (5.29) (5.25) (5.25) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) 
Constant 0.007 -0.016 -0.516 -0.462 -0.518 -0.467 
 (0.01) (-0.01) (-0.36) (-0.32) (-0.36) (-0.33) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6905 6905 3313 3313 3313 3313 




Regressions of bidder CARs (-10, +10) on free cash flow, internal financing, and institutional monitoring 
(robustness) 
This table reports the results of the regressions of acquirer returns on free cash flow, internal financing, and 
institutional ownership concentration. The acquirer return is the twenty-one-day cumulative abnormal 
return around the takeover announcement date. The major variables of interest are eight interaction terms: 
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q1, FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4, FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, 
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1, CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q4, CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4, and 
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4. FCF is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest 
expenses, taxes and total dividends scaled by book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
the acquisition announcement. CASH_FIN is a dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed with 
internally generated funds, and zero otherwise. INST_TOP1_Q1 (INST_TOP1_Q4) is an indicator variable 
for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the level of ownership controlled by the single largest 
institutional investor. INST_BLOCK_Q1 (INST_BLOCK_Q4) is a dummy variable for bidders within the 
bottom (top) quartile of the level of total ownership controlled by the institutions holding at least 5% of the 
firm’s shares. Definitions of control variables are presented in Appendix 1. Models (1) and (2) employ the 
sample with data on FCF, while Models (3) through (6) use a subset of observations for which information 
on financing sources is available. t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FCF -0.059*** -0.075***   -0.063** -0.083*** 
 (-2.76) (-3.59)   (-2.22) (-2.96) 
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q1 -0.132***    -0.178***  
 (-5.42)    (-5.50)  
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4 0.064    0.006  
 (1.58)    (0.11)  
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q1  -0.116***    -0.159*** 
  (-4.87)    (-4.97) 
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4  0.141***    0.107* 
  (3.28)    (1.73) 
CASH_FIN   -0.025 -0.025 -0.030 -0.030 
   (-1.04) (-1.06) (-1.32) (-1.31) 
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1   -0.022  0.000  
   (-0.55)  (0.00)  
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q4   0.025  0.025  
   (0.60)  (0.61)  
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q1    -0.022  -0.000 
    (-0.53)  (-0.00) 
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4    0.026  0.025 
    (0.63)  (0.61) 
INST_TOP1_Q1 0.019***  0.026**  0.016  
 (3.10)  (2.52)  (1.55)  
INST_TOP1_Q4 -0.000  0.003  0.004  
 (-0.02)  (0.26)  (0.34)  
INST_BLOCK_Q1  0.017***  0.025**  0.014 
  (2.88)  (2.46)  (1.44) 
INST_BLOCK_Q4  -0.007  0.001  -0.002 
  (-1.03)  (0.13)  (-0.20) 
LEV 0.025** 0.025* 0.037* 0.037* 0.018 0.016 
 (1.96) (1.94) (1.68) (1.68) (0.82) (0.77) 
 55 
Q -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-8.84) (-8.92) (-5.59) (-5.56) (-6.19) (-6.26) 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.95) (-3.86) (-6.51) (-6.51) (-2.71) (-2.65) 
CASH_PER 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 
 (1.60) (1.63) (1.20) (1.20) (2.22) (2.15) 
PRV 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (4.16) (4.21) (2.84) (2.82) (3.09) (3.11) 
SUB 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 
 (4.55) (4.59) (4.04) (4.02) (4.12) (4.14) 
DIVERS 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.71) (0.70) (0.61) (0.60) (0.58) (0.60) 
HOSTILE -0.030 -0.031 -0.023 -0.023 -0.031 -0.034 
 (-0.61) (-0.64) (-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.48) (-0.53) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
 (3.52) (3.61) (3.04) (3.10) (2.61) (2.74) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (8.67) (8.66) (6.75) (6.76) (6.56) (6.56) 
Constant -0.022 -0.019 -0.050 -0.049 -0.086 -0.084 
 (-0.19) (-0.17) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.53) (-0.52) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6915 6915 3341 3341 3341 3341 




Regressions of bidder CARs (-5, +5) on free cash flow, internal financing, and institutional monitoring 
(robustness) 
This table reports the results of the regressions of acquirer returns on free cash flow, internal financing, and 
institutional ownership concentration. The acquirer return is the eleven-day cumulative abnormal return 
around the takeover announcement date. The major variables of interest are eight interaction terms: FCF * 
INST_TOP1_Q1, FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4, FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4, 
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1, CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q4, CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4, and 
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4. FCF is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest 
expenses, taxes and total dividends scaled by book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
the acquisition announcement. CASH_FIN is a dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed with 
internally generated funds, and zero otherwise. We sort all firms in the Form 13F database into quartiles 
based on the level of the institutional ownership concentration. INST_TOP1_Q1 (INST_TOP1_Q4) is an 
indicator variable for bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the level of ownership controlled by the 
single largest institutional investor. INST_BLOCK_Q1 (INST_BLOCK_Q4) is a dummy variable for 
bidders within the bottom (top) quartile of the level of total ownership controlled by the institutions holding 
at least 5% of the firm’s shares. Definitions of control variables are presented in Appendix 1. Models (1) 
and (2) employ the sample with data on FCF, while Models (3) through (6) use a subset of observations for 
which information on financing sources is available. t-statistics are given in parentheses below the 
coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FCF -0.087*** -0.043**   -0.108*** -0.055** 
 (-8.53) (-2.37)   (-8.06) (-2.26) 
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q1 0.006    0.025  
 (0.33)    (0.87)  
FCF * INST_TOP1_Q4 0.110***    0.098***  
 (4.41)    (2.70)  
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q1  -0.057***    -0.067** 
  (-2.85)    (-2.48) 
FCF * INST_BLOCK_Q4  0.054*    0.042 
  (1.91)    (1.07) 
CASH_FIN   -0.027 -0.034 -0.026 -0.037 
   (-1.56) (-1.49) (-1.55) (-1.63) 
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q1   -0.084  -0.076  
   (-1.01)  (-0.93)  
CASH_FIN * INST_TOP1_Q4   0.006  0.002  
   (0.22)  (0.06)  
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q1    -0.015  -0.005 
    (-0.45)  (-0.13) 
CASH_FIN * INST_BLOCK_Q4    0.025  0.025 
    (0.85)  (0.86) 
INST_TOP1_Q1 0.046***  0.066***  0.060***  
 (4.87)  (4.56)  (3.98)  
INST_TOP1_Q4 -0.008*  0.001  -0.001  
 (-1.92)  (0.12)  (-0.20)  
INST_BLOCK_Q1  0.015***  0.023***  0.017** 
  (3.09)  (2.80)  (2.09) 
INST_BLOCK_Q4  0.000  0.010  0.008 
  (0.02)  (1.26)  (0.97) 
LEV 0.014 0.017* 0.009 0.014 -0.002 0.003 
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 (1.44) (1.77) (0.51) (0.82) (-0.15) (0.19) 
Q -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-8.09) (-8.00) (-5.39) (-5.53) (-6.07) (-5.98) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.25) (-4.11) (-5.22) (-6.25) (-2.64) (-3.53) 
CASH_PER -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (-0.39) (-0.45) (0.88) (0.81) (1.65) (1.49) 
PRV 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
 (6.15) (6.07) (5.08) (4.99) (5.32) (5.19) 
SUB 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (6.84) (6.84) (5.49) (5.50) (5.54) (5.56) 
DIVERS 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.010 
 (1.25) (1.45) (1.28) (1.53) (1.24) (1.52) 
HOSTILE -0.042 -0.042 -0.037 -0.038 -0.041 -0.042 
 (-1.11) (-1.12) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.84) (-0.86) 
TENDER_OFFER 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 
 (4.46) (4.49) (3.59) (3.85) (3.36) (3.56) 
DEAL_SIZE 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (8.09) (8.35) (5.92) (6.17) (5.83) (6.00) 
Constant 0.034 0.050 -0.069 -0.062 -0.091 -0.079 
 (0.40) (0.58) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.74) (-0.64) 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6915 6915 3341 3341 3341 3341 
R2 0.074 0.072 0.085 0.082 0.105 0.104 
 
 
